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SKILL verified MIT Self-run

Lxd Docker Firewall Conflict

skill-soulmachine-skills-lxd-docker-firewall-conflict · by soulmachine

Diagnose and fix the well-known Docker/LXD firewall conflict on a host running both. Docker sets the iptables FORWARD chain policy to DROP and accepts only its own bridges, so forwarded traffic from the LXD bridge (lxdbr0) is silently dropped and LXD containers/VMs get no outbound internet (the host itself is fine). Fix: accept the LXD bridge in the DOCKER-USER chain, then persist it with a syste…

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-soulmachine-skills-lxd-docker-firewall-conflict

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Security review

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No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

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  • Network access Used
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

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About

LXD ↔ Docker firewall conflict (FORWARD DROP)

When Docker and LXD share a host, Docker sets the iptables FORWARD chain policy to DROP and only ACCEPTs traffic for its own bridges. Forwarded packets from the LXD bridge (lxdbr0) match nothing and fall through to the DROP policy, so LXD containers/VMs lose all outbound internet — even though the host itself is fine and the LXD bridge has ipv4.nat=true. The fix is to ACCEPT the LXD bridge in Docker's DOCKER-USER chain and persist it.

⚠️ This is not a NAT, DNS, or LXD-config problem. The bridge's ipv4.nat=true and net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 are already correct — packets are dropped at the FORWARD hook before NAT ever applies. Don't waste time reconfiguring the bridge, DNS, or lxd init.

Quick start

# Detects managed LXD bridges, adds DOCKER-USER ACCEPT rules, and installs a
# systemd unit so they survive reboots + docker restarts. Idempotent; re-runnable.
bash scripts/fix-lxd-docker-forward.sh

Symptoms

  • Inside an LXD container, apt update / apt-get / curl times out on IPv4 (connection timed out,

Failed to fetch) and/or instantly says Network is unreachable on IPv6.

  • The exact same request works on the host.
  • A packer-lxd image build errors in its first shell provisioner at apt update → `Failed to fetch ...

Could not connect ... connection timed out`.

  • It began right after Docker was installed on the LXD host (or after a Docker upgrade re-applied rules).

Diagnose (3 checks)

# 1. Host reaches the internet but the container does not -> forwarding/firewall, not DNS/NAT.
curl -4 -sI http://archive.ubuntu.com | head -1            # host: "HTTP/1.1 200 OK"

# 2. The smoking gun: FORWARD policy DROP + Docker jumps, and DOCKER-USER does NOT accept the LXD bridge.
sudo iptables -S FORWARD            # -> "-P FORWARD DROP"  and  "-A FORWARD -j DOCKER-USER"
sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER        # -> only "-N DOCKER-USER" (empty): nothing accepts lxdbr0
sudo iptables -L FORWARD -n -v | head -3   # the "policy DROP" pkt/byte counter climbs while a container retries

# 3. Prove the bridge is fine (rules out the usual red herrings).
lxc network get lxdbr0 ipv4.nat     # -> true
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward          # -> net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1

If FORWARD is policy DROP with Docker jumps and DOCKER-USER has no lxdbr0 ACCEPT, it's this bug.

Fix

Docker reserves the DOCKER-USER chain — evaluated first in FORWARD and never flushed by Docker — for exactly this. Accept the LXD bridge in both directions:

sudo iptables -I DOCKER-USER -i lxdbr0 -j ACCEPT   # container -> internet
sudo iptables -I DOCKER-USER -o lxdbr0 -j ACCEPT   # replies   -> container

Replace lxdbr0 with your managed bridge name if different (lxc network list shows MANAGED=YES bridges).

Persist across reboots

Manually-added rules are lost on reboot (Docker recreates DOCKER-USER empty at boot). Do not reach for iptables-persistent / netfilter-persistent here — it snapshots Docker's volatile per-container rules and races Docker's own boot-time setup. Instead use a tiny oneshot unit ordered after docker.service that idempotently re-inserts only our rules (this is what the Quick-start script installs):

# /etc/systemd/system/lxd-docker-forward.service
[Unit]
Description=Persist LXD bridge ACCEPT rules in Docker's DOCKER-USER chain
After=docker.service
Wants=docker.service

[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/iptables -N DOCKER-USER
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c '/usr/sbin/iptables -C DOCKER-USER -i lxdbr0 -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || /usr/sbin/iptables -I DOCKER-USER -i lxdbr0 -j ACCEPT'
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c '/usr/sbin/iptables -C DOCKER-USER -o lxdbr0 -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || /usr/sbin/iptables -I DOCKER-USER -o lxdbr0 -j ACCEPT'

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now lxd-docker-forward.service

Verify

lxc launch ubuntu:24.04 nettest
lxc exec nettest -- curl -4 -sI http://archive.ubuntu.com | head -1   # "HTTP/1.1 200 OK"
lxc delete -f nettest

Prove persistence actually rebuilds the rules (simulates a fresh boot's empty chain). ⚠️ Briefly drops LXD container connectivity — run only when no LXD instances need the network:

sudo iptables -F DOCKER-USER                            # empty it, as at boot
sudo systemctl restart lxd-docker-forward.service
sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER                            # the two ACCEPT rules are back

Why (nftables semantics)

On modern Ubuntu both Docker (iptables-nft) and LXD (its own inet lxd table) attach base chains to the kernel's forward netfilter hook. A packet must survive every base chain at that hook: LXD can accept in its own table, but Docker's ip filter FORWARD chain with policy drop then drops it anyway (in nftables, one chain's accept does not override another chain's drop at the same hook). Placing an ACCEPT in DOCKER-USER (part of the ip filter table) resolves that table's verdict to accept, so the packet is no longer dropped. NAT (ipv4.nat=true) lives in the nat table at a different hook and never runs because the packet is already gone at forward.

Notes & gotchas

  • IPv6 noise: lxdbr0 defaults to ipv6.address=none, so the instant Network is unreachable on IPv6

in logs is harmless — the real failure is the IPv4 timeout. If you enable IPv6 on the bridge, the same rules apply (the script covers every managed bridge, both directions).

  • Renamed / multiple bridges: the script auto-detects all MANAGED=YES bridges; override with

BRIDGES="lxdbr0 lxdbr1" bash scripts/fix-lxd-docker-forward.sh.

  • Docker restarts preserve DOCKER-USER contents, so the rules survive systemctl restart docker; only a

reboot empties the chain — which the systemd unit handles.

  • Same class of bug hits any non-Docker bridge on a Docker host (libvirt virbr0, Incus, plain

brctl/netplan bridges): same DOCKER-USER fix, just a different interface name.

  • Alternative (not recommended): "iptables": false in /etc/docker/daemon.json stops Docker managing

the firewall entirely, but then you own all of Docker's NAT/port rules yourself. The DOCKER-USER approach is the supported one.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.