Install
$ agentstack add skill-t3chnaztea-unifi-skills-unifi-wifi ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
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Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
UniFi Wi-Fi
Most "slow Wi-Fi" is not slow Wi-Fi. It is a WAN problem, a backhaul problem, a client problem, or a bandwidth cap somebody set two years ago. The diagnostic ladder below exists to find that out cheaply, in that order, before touching radios. Radio changes are the most disruptive and the most often wrong.
The diagnostic ladder
Run it top to bottom. Each rung eliminates a layer, and the failure that motivated this skill was only visible at the last rung.
1. Rule out the WAN. Trigger a gateway-side speedtest, which measures the gateway to the internet with no Wi-Fi involved:
udm raw POST /proxy/network/api/s/default/cmd/devmgr '{"cmd":"speedtest"}'
# wait, then read the RESULT from stat/device, not stat/health
udm devices --json | python3 -c '
import json,sys
for d in json.load(sys.stdin):
s = d.get("speedtest-status")
if s: print(d.get("name"), s.get("xput_download"), s.get("xput_upload"),
"status_summary=", s.get("status_summary"))'
The result lands on the gateway's device object, under the hyphenated key speedtest-status (not speedtest_status), with throughput in the nested xput_download and xput_upload fields. status_summary tells you whether the run finished; a fresh gateway that has never run one reports zeros. stat/health is a different number entirely and will send you in circles.
2. Check the AP's uplink. An AP on a 100 Mbps link, or meshed rather than wired, caps every client behind it:
udm devices --json | python3 -c '
import json,sys
for d in json.load(sys.stdin):
up = d.get("uplink") or {}
print(d.get("name"), d.get("type"), up.get("speed"), up.get("type"))'
3. Check the client's own view. Signal, negotiated rate, satisfaction:
udm clients --json | python3 -c '
import json,sys
for c in json.load(sys.stdin):
print(c.get("hostname"), c.get("signal"), c.get("tx_rate"), c.get("satisfaction"))'
This rung is where the interesting case appears. A client at -57 dBm with an 866 Mbps PHY rate has an excellent link. If it measures 32 Mbps, the radio is fine and something is contending. Signal is not throughput, and confusing the two is why people replace working access points.
4. Rule out a bandwidth cap. Somebody, possibly you, may have set one:
udm raw GET /proxy/network/api/s/default/rest/usergroup
udm wlans --json # check per-SSID rate limits
5. Compare every AP's channel, width, and channel utilization. The last rung, and the one that finds co-channel contention:
udm devices --json | python3 -c '
import json,sys
for d in json.load(sys.stdin):
for r in d.get("radio_table_stats") or []:
print(d.get("name"), r.get("radio"), "ch", r.get("channel"),
"bw", r.get("bw"), "cu_total", r.get("cu_total"),
"sat", r.get("satisfaction"))'
Field names matter here and are not the obvious ones. Channel width is bw, not channel_width. cu_total is channel utilization, the percentage of airtime in use, and it is the closest thing to a direct measurement of the problem this skill is about. cu_self_tx and cu_self_rx break out how much of that is this AP's own traffic: high cu_total with low cu_self_* means somebody else is using your airtime, which is either a neighbor or, more often, your own AP two rooms away on the same channel.
satisfaction reports -1 when a radio has no clients on it. That is "no data", not "terrible".
Read radio_table_stats, the operational state, not radio_table, the config. They disagree more often than you would like.
The 80 MHz trap
The failure that motivated this skill, because it is a change that looks free.
Setting every 5 GHz radio to 80 MHz doubles the theoretical per-client rate, so it reads like a pure upgrade. It is not, because width is bought with channels. In the US regulatory domain, 80 MHz with DFS channels disabled leaves exactly two non-overlapping blocks:
- UNII-1: channels 36 / 40 / 44 / 48
- UNII-3: channels 149 / 153 / 157 / 161
Two blocks. If you have more than two 5 GHz APs with overlapping coverage, some of them are sharing an 80 MHz block and taking turns transmitting. Wi-Fi degrades gracefully in signal terms and catastrophically in contention terms: everything looks healthy right up until two clients are busy simultaneously.
The observed case: four APs, three of them in-wall units on adjacent walls, all piled into UNII-1 after a global switch to 80 MHz. Result was roughly 32 Mbps on a gigabit connection, with an 866 Mbps PHY link at -57 dBm and a confirmed 1276 Mbps gateway speedtest. Neither ISP, backhaul, nor signal was the cap.
Do not disable DFS channels when auditing a channel plan. It is the change that creates the pileup. DFS opens blocks 52-64 and 100-144, which is the difference between two usable 80 MHz blocks and roughly seven.
The tradeoff is real and worth stating honestly: DFS channels require radar detection, cost a ~50-60 second silent scan when a radio moves onto one, and some older or cheap client devices will not associate on them at all. Weigh that against four APs sharing one block. In a dense deployment, 40 MHz on non-overlapping channels beats 80 MHz on shared ones, every time.
Changing a radio channel safely
# 1. GET the full device object
udm devices --json > /tmp/devices.json
# 2. Extract the device's complete radio_table, change ONLY `channel`
# on the target radio, leave every other field intact
# 3. PUT the whole device object back
udm raw PUT /proxy/network/api/s/default/rest/device/ ''
PUT the full radio_table. A partial write resets the fields you omitted, including transmit power and width on the radio you were not touching.
Moving onto a DFS channel triggers a ~50-60 second CAC (channel availability check). The radio goes silent for the scan and clients drop and reconnect once. This is normal and it is not your write failing. Do it when nobody is on a call.
Verify from live radio_table_stats[].channel, not the PUT echo. The controller will echo back a channel it has not moved to yet, or in the DFS case, one it is still scanning for. Re-read after the CAC completes.
SSID hygiene
udm wlans --json | python3 -c '
import json,sys
for w in json.load(sys.stdin):
print(w.get("name"), w.get("enabled"), w.get("security"), w.get("networkconf_id"))'
- Re-read
enabledon everywlanconftouch. An SSID that was deliberately
disabled can come back: a controller update, a config restore, or somebody in the UI. Deliberate disables do not always stay disabled, so make checking the state part of the routine rather than assuming your last change held.
- Never leave an open SSID on the trusted network. If a device genuinely
cannot do WPA2, and some old handhelds and IoT gear cannot, rebuild that SSID on the guest or IoT network where an open join reaches nothing. An open SSID bridged to the trusted LAN is an unauthenticated port on your network with a radius of about 40 metres.
- Hidden SSIDs are not security. They are broadcast in probe requests by every
client configured for them. They mainly make life harder for you.
- Confirm each SSID's
networkconf_idmaps to the network you think it does.
This is how a device ends up on the trusted VLAN despite a careful segmentation plan: it joined the SSID that was still pointed at the old network.
The in-wall AP port trap
Filed here because it is AP hardware behavior, though it bites during wired segmentation.
AC-series in-wall APs do not enforce native-VLAN overrides on their pass-through data ports. Set a port override on the AP, and the controller accepts it and echoes native_networkconf_id back in port_table as though it applied. The operational forward value stays all, and untagged traffic from the device behind that port keeps bridging onto the AP's own network.
Verified with two force-provisions and a forward:'native' variant. The device behind the port stayed reachable on the old subnet throughout, which is the tell: the config says isolated, the network says otherwise.
Devices behind in-wall AP data ports cannot be VLAN-jailed. Not a configuration problem, so do not burn an afternoon on payload variants. Re-cable to a real switch port, or accept it and document the exception. Once you know this, it takes ten seconds to check whether a stubborn device is behind one.
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: t3chnaztea
- Source: t3chnaztea/unifi-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.