Install
$ agentstack add skill-trilwu-gauntlet-loop-skills-security-vuln-gauntlet ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Security Vuln Gauntlet
The Gauntlet Loop applied to finding real vulnerabilities: a HUNTER (builder) proposes candidates and a blind VALIDATOR (critic) demands a working PoC before anything counts. The bar is exploitability + CWE mapping + real precedent. Covers web, API, binary/memory, and cloud/IaC.
> Kept separate from the core gauntlet-loop skill because its triggers and safety requirements differ: written authorization (ROE) is mandatory and every PoC must be non-destructive. The method itself is the core loop.
SCOPE AND AUTHORIZATION — mandatory
Use only on assets you own or are authorized in writing to test. If there is no ROE, STOP and ask the user for one. Read references/safety-and-scope.md first.
Every PoC must be non-destructive: no data destruction, no lateral movement, no exfiltration, no denial of service. This is a defensive/AppSec tool. Unauthorized access is a crime in most jurisdictions (CFAA in the US, the Computer Misuse Act in the UK, equivalent computer-crime statutes elsewhere) and the operator carries that responsibility.
When to use it
Reviewing or pentesting an authorized codebase, service, binary, or cloud configuration — or triaging an existing scan down to what is actually exploitable.
Role mapping
| Core role | Security role | |-----------|---------------| | LEAD | Split by trust boundary / entry point / high-value asset; maintain the coverage map | | BUILDER | HUNTER (clean context): propose candidates with an exploitation hypothesis (source → sink) | | CRITIC | VALIDATOR (blind): inspect the real artifact, check reachability and taint, build the PoC. No PoC, no pass |
The bar (three axes, all required)
- Exploitability: a working PoC or equivalent evidence under the target's actual conditions — not "theoretically possible".
- CWE mapping (prefer the CWE Top 25): map to a meaningful weakness class, e.g. CWE-89, CWE-79, CWE-787, CWE-416, CWE-918, CWE-862, CWE-22, CWE-502.
- Real precedent (never fabricated): point to the real-world vulnerability class or a genuine CVE to calibrate severity and credibility. If you cannot find a precedent, write "novel/uncertain" — do not invent a CVE ID.
The loop
- Scope, bar, and budget. Read the ROE first.
- LEAD split: map trust boundaries, entry points (attacker-controlled input), dangerous sinks, and high-value assets (auth, money, PII, RCE surface). Divide into hunting units.
- HUNTER × N (parallel, clean contexts): each returns
{location, source, sink, taint path, preconditions, confidence, PoC idea}. - VALIDATOR (blind): for every candidate, run Reachability → Taint → PoC in order. PASS only with evidence. Techniques:
references/false-positive-killing.md. - Score against the bar: CWE, CVSS, precedent. Drop anything below the bar.
- Repeat: feed FAILs back to the hunters; chase chains and variants; run longer; record coverage gaps.
- Report: confirmed findings (with PoC) kept strictly separate from unconfirmed ones, each with remediation.
Source → sink checklists
Web, API, binary/memory, and cloud/IaC are covered in references/checklists-by-domain.md, with OWASP Top 10 / API Top 10 / ASVS / CWE / CIS mappings, sanitizer-bypass notes, and the per-domain bar signals.
Worked examples
- Web (path traversal, with a PoC plus a killed false positive):
references/example-web-run.md. - IDOR/API, binary crash triage, and cloud IAM privilege escalation: inside
references/checklists-by-domain.md. - An end-to-end run across several hunting units:
../../examples/example-security-run.md.
Output
For every CONFIRMED finding: title, CWE ID, severity (with a suggested CVSS vector), the non-destructive PoC or evidence, the source → sink path, preconditions, and remediation. Findings without a PoC are reported as UNCONFIRMED in a separate section. Include the coverage map and a reference to the ROE.
References
references/safety-and-scope.md— ROE template, PoC constraints, logging.references/false-positive-killing.md— the reachability → taint → PoC gates.references/checklists-by-domain.md— web / API / binary / cloud (source → sink + bar + OWASP/CWE/CIS).references/example-web-run.md— one loop round with a PoC.
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: trilwu
- Source: trilwu/gauntlet-loop-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.