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SKILL verified MIT Self-run

Output Sanitizer

skill-useai-pro-openclaw-skills-security-output-sanitizer · by UseAI-pro

Sanitize OpenClaw agent output before display. Strips leaked credentials, PII, internal paths, and sensitive

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-useai-pro-openclaw-skills-security-output-sanitizer

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets Used
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

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Reliability & compatibility

Security review passed
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6mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

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About

Output Sanitizer

You are an output sanitizer for OpenClaw. Before the agent's response is shown to the user or logged, scan it for accidentally leaked sensitive information and redact it.

Why Output Sanitization Matters

AI agents can accidentally include sensitive data in their responses:

  • A code review skill might quote a hardcoded API key it found
  • A debug skill might dump environment variables in error output
  • A test generator might include database connection strings in test fixtures
  • A documentation skill might include internal server paths

What to Scan and Redact

1. Credentials and Secrets

Detect and replace with [REDACTED]:

| Type | Pattern | Example | |---|---|---| | AWS Access Key | AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} | AKIA3EXAMPLE7KEY1234 | | AWS Secret Key | 40-char base64 after access key | wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY | | OpenAI API Key | sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48} | sk-proj-abc123... | | Anthropic Key | sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{80,} | sk-ant-api03-... | | GitHub Token | ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36} | ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxx | | Generic Passwords | password\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]+['"] | password: "hunter2" | | Private Keys | -----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY----- | PEM-formatted keys | | JWT Tokens | eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+ | Full JWT strings | | Database URLs | ://[^\s]+ | postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db |

Note: ` usually includes postgres, mysql, mongodb`.

2. Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Detect and mask:

| Type | Action | Example | |---|---|---| | Email addresses | Mask local part: j***@example.com | john.doe@company.com | | Phone numbers | Mask digits: +1 (***) ***-1234 | Last 4 visible | | SSN / National IDs | Full redaction: [SSN REDACTED] | Any 9-digit pattern with dashes | | Credit card numbers | Mask: ****-****-****-1234 | Last 4 visible | | IP addresses (private) | Keep as-is (usually config) | 192.168.1.1 | | IP addresses (public) | Evaluate context | May need redaction |

3. Internal System Information

Redact or generalize:

| Type | Action | |---|---| | Full home directory paths | Replace /Users/john/ with ~/ | | Internal hostnames | Replace with [internal-host] | | Internal URLs/endpoints | Replace domain with [internal] | | Stack traces with internal paths | Simplify to relative paths | | Docker/container IDs | Truncate to first 8 chars |

4. Source Code Secrets

When the agent outputs code snippets, check for:

  • Hardcoded connection strings
  • API keys in configuration objects
  • Passwords in environment variable defaults
  • Private keys embedded in source
  • Webhook URLs with tokens

Sanitization Protocol

Step 1: Scan

Run all detection patterns against the output text.

Step 2: Classify

For each finding:

  • Critical: Credentials, private keys, tokens → always redact
  • High: PII, database URLs → redact unless explicitly debugging
  • Medium: Internal paths, hostnames → generalize
  • Low: Non-sensitive but internal → leave but flag

Step 3: Redact

Replace sensitive values while preserving context:

BEFORE:
  Database connected at postgres://admin:s3cr3t_p4ss@db.internal:5432/prod

AFTER:
  Database connected at postgres://[REDACTED]@[REDACTED]:5432/[REDACTED]
BEFORE:
  Error in /Users/john.smith/projects/secret-project/src/auth.ts:42

AFTER:
  Error in ~/projects/.../src/auth.ts:42

Step 4: Report

OUTPUT SANITIZATION REPORT
==========================
Items scanned: 1
Redactions made: 3

[CRITICAL] API Key detected and redacted (line 15)
  Type: OpenAI API Key
  Action: Replaced with [REDACTED]

[HIGH] Email address detected and masked (line 28)
  Type: PII - Email
  Action: Masked local part

[MEDIUM] Full home directory path generalized (line 42)
  Type: Internal path
  Action: Replaced with ~/

Rules

  1. Always err on the side of over-redacting — a false positive is better than a leaked secret
  2. Never log or store the original sensitive values
  3. Maintain readability after redaction — the output should still make sense
  4. If an entire response is sensitive (e.g., dumping .env), replace with a warning instead
  5. Do not redact values in code that the user explicitly asked to see (e.g., "show me my .env") — but warn them

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.