Install
$ agentstack add skill-vinayaklatthe-microsoft-security-skills-defender-for-cloud-ai ✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
About
Microsoft Defender for Cloud — AI Workload Protection
Defender for Cloud's AI plan protects the AI workloads themselves — the Azure OpenAI, Azure AI Foundry, Amazon Bedrock, and Google Vertex AI deployments your organization runs. Two capabilities:
- AI Security Posture Management (AI-SPM): agentless discovery and posture (where AI
is deployed, what grounding data is exposed, what misconfigurations exist).
- Runtime threat protection for AI workloads: detections on Azure OpenAI for prompt
injection, jailbreaks, sensitive-data leakage, wallet abuse, and credential leakage, integrating Azure AI Content Safety Prompt Shields.
When to use
You build or operate generative AI applications on Azure OpenAI / Azure AI Foundry (and optionally Bedrock/Vertex), and need posture + runtime detection on the workload side.
Do not use this skill for end-user-side AI governance (purview-ai-hub), Content Safety policy authoring (azure-ai-content-safety), or M365 Copilot rollout (copilot-for-m365-readiness).
What you get
| Capability | Scope | |---|---| | Multicloud AI discovery | Azure (OpenAI, Foundry), AWS Bedrock, GCP Vertex AI (via existing multicloud connectors) | | Sensitive grounding data exposure | Identifies grounding storage with sensitive data + public/over-permissive access | | Attack path analysis | "Internet-exposed AI endpoint with sensitive grounding + over-privileged identity" | | Runtime detections (Azure OpenAI) | Prompt injection, jailbreak, sensitive data leakage in prompts/responses, suspicious access patterns, wallet abuse | | Prompt Shields integration | Detections leverage Content Safety prompt-shield signals | | Alerts in Defender XDR | Correlated incidents alongside cloud and identity signals |
Approach
- Prereqs. Defender for Cloud enabled at subscription scope. Defender CSPM
plan on (provides AI-SPM via attack path analysis). Defender for AI Services runtime plan on for Azure OpenAI workloads. For non-Microsoft clouds, the AWS/GCP connector must already be in place.
- Discover AI assets. Within 24 hours of enablement, Defender for Cloud inventory
shows Azure OpenAI, Foundry, Bedrock, and Vertex resources. Review the AI Security posture dashboard:
- Which AI resources are public-network-exposed.
- Which use Microsoft Entra (good) vs API key (warns).
- Which grounding stores (Azure AI Search, Blob, Cosmos) contain sensitive data
classified by Purview, and whether they're over-permissioned.
- Triage attack paths first. The high-value paths are typically:
- *Internet-exposed Azure OpenAI endpoint + grounding store with sensitive data +
identity with broad RBAC.*
- *Foundry hub with public networking + customer-managed grounding data + no Content
Safety filter.* Fix the path (private endpoint, scope identity, enable Content Safety) rather than triaging each finding in isolation.
- Enable runtime detection (Azure OpenAI). Single toggle per subscription. The
service samples prompts/responses (subject to your data privacy configuration) and evaluates against Microsoft's threat models plus Prompt Shields.
- Wire Content Safety Prompt Shields in your application's Azure OpenAI call
chain. Defender alerts gain higher fidelity when Prompt Shields are active because the workload itself has rejected the attempt — Defender now alerts the SOC.
- Alert response runbook.
- Prompt injection / jailbreak detected: enrich with caller identity, source
IP, repeat rate; if persistent, revoke API key / disable user.
- Sensitive data leakage in response: investigate grounding data; tighten
RBAC on grounding store; add Content Safety output filter.
- Wallet abuse (high cost from a single principal): rate-limit, revoke,
investigate compromised credential.
- Credential leakage in prompt: rotate the leaked secret, hunt for prior
exposure in logs.
- Defender XDR / Sentinel integration. Alerts surface under "Microsoft Defender
for AI Services" / "Cloud" categories. Build cross-product correlations (e.g., AI alert + Defender for Cloud Apps anomalous user activity).
- Continuous posture review. Weekly: new AI deployments without private endpoint,
new grounding stores with sensitive data, new identities with broad AI RBAC.
Guardrails
- Runtime protection samples prompts/responses. Validate data privacy posture and
customer-facing disclosures; in some regulated industries this requires customer consent.
- Public endpoints are the dominant risk. AI services default to public unless you
configure private endpoints; bake into landing-zone policy.
- API key auth is the second dominant risk. Force Entra-based authentication; rotate
any keys quarterly minimum.
- Grounding data is the new database. Same crown-jewel treatment — sensitivity
labels, RBAC scoping, Defender for Storage on the source.
- Content Safety is separate from Defender. You need both: Content Safety blocks at
the model call, Defender detects/alerts on the security incident.
- Defender for AI does not protect against business-logic abuse of your AI app. That
remains your application's responsibility (input validation, rate limits, auth).
- Multicloud AI runtime detection is staged rollout. Verify what's GA vs preview for
Bedrock/Vertex in your region.
Common anti-patterns
- "AI workload deployed with public endpoint + API key for 'developer velocity'" —
becomes a permanent attack surface and the #1 alert source.
- "Grounding data store with sensitive data and 'Reader' to AAD-everyone'" —
exposure surfaces in Copilot-of-your-app the same way M365 Copilot oversharing does.
- "Enabled Content Safety Prompt Shields, skipped Defender for AI" — you reject
attacks but don't see the campaign or correlate with identity.
- "Enabled Defender for AI without Defender CSPM" — lose attack path analysis,
alerts arrive without context.
- "Treated wallet-abuse alerts as cost management problem only" — usually a
compromised credential. Investigate as a security incident.
- "Sentinel alert routing not configured" — alerts pile in DfC console, no SOC
triage.
- "API key 'temporarily' in code" — leaked credentials trigger detections, but
you've already paid the cost.
Example prompts
- `Enable Defender for Cloud AI plan across 12 subscriptions with Azure OpenAI and AI
Foundry deployments.`
Inventory AI workloads and grounding stores; identify top-10 attack paths.Build runbook for "Prompt injection detected" alerts: triage, containment, hunt.- `Integrate Azure AI Content Safety Prompt Shields with our Foundry chat app and
enable Defender runtime detection.`
- `Posture pipeline: Azure Policy to require private endpoint + Entra auth on all
Azure OpenAI resources.`
Connect AWS Bedrock and GCP Vertex AI usage into Defender AI-SPM.- `Sentinel detection correlating Defender AI wallet-abuse alert with sign-in risk on
the calling identity.`
Microsoft Learn
- AI plan overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/ai-threat-protection
- AI-SPM: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/ai-security-posture
- Enable threat protection for AI: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/ai-threat-protection
- Alerts reference (AI): https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/alerts-reference#alerts-ai
- Attack path: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/concept-attack-path
- Azure AI Content Safety Prompt Shields: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/ai-services/content-safety/concepts/jailbreak-detection
- Azure OpenAI Entra auth: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/ai-services/openai/how-to/managed-identity
- Multicloud connectors: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/defender-for-cloud/multicloud
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: vinayaklatthe
- Source: vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.