Install
$ agentstack add skill-yue-zhou1-zkcrypto-audit-crypto-audit-context ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
crypto-audit-context
Start here before claiming vulnerabilities.
Core principle: verify what the code actually enforces, not what the docs claim.
When to Use
- Beginning a ZK or cryptographic audit
- Reading unfamiliar verifier, prover, signature, DKG, or serialization code
- Building a threat model before bug hunting
- Prioritizing which files and functions deserve the deepest review first
When NOT to Use
- Verifying whether a specific suspected finding is a true positive
- Writing final severity decisions or report-ready findings
- Querying prior-art or disclosure state
Audit Priority
Review highest-risk code first:
- Critical path —
verify,batch_verify,deserialize,from_bytes, transcript/challenge generation,keygen,sign,prove - Trust boundary —
unsafeblocks, FFI modules, unchecked constructors, parameter loading - Supporting — caches, zeroization, type conversions, error conversion, optimized backends
Rationalizations to Reject
| Rationalization | Why it is wrong | |---|---| | "The README explains the architecture" | READMEs describe intent, not enforcement | | "I'll map trust boundaries later during domain review" | Domain skills assume the dimension map is already built | | "The codebase is small, I can hold the context in my head" | Small codebases have the same attack-surface density |
Workflow
Phase 1: Map the critical path
- Identify verifier, transcript, parsing, and randomness entrypoints
- Mark code that handles attacker-controlled or externally supplied values
Phase 2: Build the dimension map
- Read
references/dimensional-analysis.md - Assign dimensions to values that cross trust boundaries
- Treat every unknown or inherited dimension as suspicious until proven safe
Phase 3: Build the protocol threat model
- Read
references/threat-model-checklist.md - Record replay surfaces, authentication roots, downgrade surfaces, and corruption model assumptions
Phase 4: Produce the audit handoff
- Summarize the highest-risk paths
- Name unresolved assumptions
- Hand off to a domain auditor or verification skill
- Initialize or update session state in
zk-findings/sessions/.json
using zk-findings/sessions/session-state-schema.json
- Persist trust boundaries, open findings, and next-step routes so follow-on
conversations continue from the same state
Output Contract
Produce a context handoff that includes:
- Critical paths and trust boundaries that deserve deepest review
- Dimension-map anomalies and unresolved assumptions
- Threat-model notes that the next skill must preserve
- Recommended next skills, with a brief reason for each route
- Session state path updated in
zk-findings/sessions/for downstream handoffs
Reference Index
- [references/dimensional-analysis.md](references/dimensional-analysis.md)
- [references/threat-model-checklist.md](references/threat-model-checklist.md)
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: Yue-Zhou1
- Source: Yue-Zhou1/zkcrypto-audit
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.