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SKILL verified MIT Self-run

Competition Prompt Injection

skill-zhaoxuya520-reverse-skill-competition-prompt-injection · by zhaoxuya520

Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for prompt-injection, retrieval poisoning, memory contamination, planner drift, MCP or tool-boundary abuse, and agent exfiltration challenges. Use when the user asks to analyze prompt injection, retrieval poisoning, memory contamination, planner drift, tool-argument corruption, or secret exposure caused by an agent chain…

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-zhaoxuya520-reverse-skill-competition-prompt-injection

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

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Reliability & compatibility

Security review passed
0 installs to date
no reviews yet
1mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

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About

Competition Prompt Injection

Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator first.

Use this skill when the challenge is primarily about trust boundaries inside an agentic system.

Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.

Quick Start

  1. Identify the first untrusted content that becomes model-visible.
  2. Map the chain from retrieval, memory, or transcript into planner or executor behavior.
  3. Record the exact point where text becomes a tool argument, file path, network target, or secret request.
  4. Prove one minimal exploit chain before exploring variants.
  5. Keep prompt snippets and tool transitions in compact evidence blocks.

Workflow

1. Map The Control Stack

  • Track system, developer, user, retrieved, memory, planner, and tool-response layers separately.
  • Distinguish claimed capability from runtime-exposed capability.
  • Note what the model can actually call, read, or mutate.

2. Prove The Boundary Crossing

  • Reproduce one chain from untrusted text to changed planner behavior, changed tool args, or secret exposure.
  • Keep the decisive transcript compact: source chunk, rewritten planner state, final tool invocation.
  • Prefer the smallest transcript that still demonstrates the bug.

3. Report By Boundary

  • State which layer failed: retrieval, summarizer, planner, executor, tool normalization, or output post-processing.
  • Separate instruction drift from actual side effect.

Read This Reference

  • Load references/prompt-injection.md for the checklist, evidence layout, and common prompt-boundary pitfalls.

What To Preserve

  • Original malicious chunk or prompt
  • Intermediate summary or planner drift if it matters
  • Final tool args, file paths, or exposed secret surface

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.