Webauthn Prf Wallet

WebAuthn PRF Wallet

A reusable pattern for deriving an Ethereum private key from a user's passkey entirely on the client, with the key never leaving an isolated iframe. This skill captures the implementation from the 1Shot Payments app, distilled so that it can be dropped into any web application.

What you get:

• A deterministic passkey ⇒ EVM private key derivation that produces the same wallet every time the user authenticates with the same passkey.
• An isolated wallet iframe that holds the derived key in memory and signs transactions via a narrow RPC surface — the key is never reachable from the parent page's JavaScript, substantially reducing XSS/supply-chain risk.
• Platform support gating (PRF is not universally available) with a LongBlob + recovery-phrase fallback so users on incompatible authenticators can still have an account.

What you do NOT get from this skill alone:

• A product. You still need to wire up registration UI, session management, a relying party (RP) configuration, and whatever use case you're building (signing, payments, delegations, etc.).
• A server. The skill shows what the server must do (challenge storage, signature verification) but does not prescribe the stack — Next.js is shown as an example in references/nextjs-example.md.

Quick Reference

Detailed references — read the one(s) relevant to your task:

• [references/prf-derivation.md](./references/prf-derivation.md) — How PRF output becomes a valid secp256k1 private key. Read this when implementing the derivation function or debugging "wrong address" issues.
• [references/platform-support.md](./references/platform-support.md) — Browser/OS compatibility matrix, webview detection, isPlatformSupported() helper. Read this when gating registration or showing a "not supported" message.
• [references/iframe-isolation.md](./references/iframe-isolation.md) — Postmate cross-frame RPC, iframe allow attribute, the user-activation / visibility gotcha that breaks WebAuthn in hidden iframes. Read this when setting up the wallet iframe or debugging "no passkey prompt appears" in the iframe.
• [references/longblob-fallback.md](./references/longblob-fallback.md) — credBlob / largeBlob storage, recovery-phrase encryption, multi-passkey support. Read this when you want PRF-incompatible devices to still work, or when supporting multiple passkeys per account.
• [references/server-integration.md](./references/server-integration.md) — Generating registration/authentication options with PRF salts, verifying responses, and what to persist. Framework-agnostic.
• [references/nextjs-example.md](./references/nextjs-example.md) — Concrete walkthrough using Next.js App Router + @simplewebauthn + Redis for challenges.

Copy-ready code (in assets/):

• assets/prfToValidEthPrivKey.ts — HKDF → secp256k1 derivation (browser-safe, Web Crypto API).
• assets/platformSupport.ts — Browser/OS/webview detection using Bowser.
• assets/WalletIframeSketch.ts — Minimal Postmate Model that derives the key and exposes a signMessage RPC. Strip out what you don't need.

Package Installation

npm install @simplewebauthn/browser @simplewebauthn/server ethers viem postmate bowser

At runtime the pattern uses the platform crypto.subtle API (no polyfill needed in modern browsers). Server-side you need a KV store for challenges with a short TTL (Redis is used in the reference, any equivalent works).

Core Concepts

1. The PRF extension is a deterministic, per-credential secret

PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) is a WebAuthn extension that lets the authenticator evaluate an HMAC-SHA-256 over an input you provide (the "salt") using a secret key it keeps for that credential. Properties you care about:

• Deterministic. The same credential + same eval.first salt always produces the same 32-byte output.
• Scoped to a credential. A different passkey produces a different PRF output, even with the same input. This is why you generally bind one wallet = one credential unless you use the LongBlob fallback (see references/longblob-fallback.md).
• Never leaves the authenticator without user presence + verification. The user consents to each evaluation via biometrics / PIN.
• Not available everywhere. See references/platform-support.md.

You use the PRF output as keying material, then run HKDF → secp256k1 to produce an Ethereum private key. The PRF output is not itself a valid key — it could be zero or above the curve order.

2. The derivation must converge on the same key forever

The derivation inputs are:

• prfOutput — 32 bytes from the authenticator, depends on the info label you pass as eval.first.
• infoLabel — a UTF-8 string you choose, e.g. "com.example.eth-key-v1".
• HKDF parameters — salt (32 zero bytes is fine; PRF output is already scoped to the credential), info (infoLabel ‖ counter byte), hash = SHA-256, output length = 32 bytes.

The infoLabel is a forever decision. If you change it after users have registered, their derived key changes and they lose access to their wallet. Version it in the string itself (e.g. -v1) and never change that version.

The HKDF output may occasionally be ≥ the secp256k1 curve order or zero. Retry with counter = 0, 1, 2, …, 15; in practice counter 0 succeeds with overwhelming probability. See assets/prfToValidEthPrivKey.ts for the full implementation.

3. Isolate the key in an iframe

The derived private key must never be reachable from the main application's JavaScript context. If the parent page is compromised (XSS, malicious dependency), the attacker gets the user's funds.

The pattern:

• Host a dedicated wallet page at a same-origin route (e.g. /wallet/local). This page has minimal dependencies — only what's needed for passkey auth and signing.
• Embed that page in a hidden ` on the main app. The iframe must have allow="publickey-credentials-get publickey-credentials-create"`.
• Communicate via structured RPC (Postmate is a thin wrapper over postMessage that's well-suited here). The parent calls methods like signIn, getERC3009Signature, getAccountAddress; the iframe runs the passkey ceremony and signs inside its own context.
• The iframe caches the unlocked wallet in module-level (closure) state. The parent never receives the key.

See references/iframe-isolation.md for the non-obvious bits: WebAuthn requires the iframe's ancestor chain to NOT be display:none, and navigator.userActivation must be preserved across the postMessage hop.

4. PRF is primary, LongBlob is the compatibility path

Because PRF is not supported on every browser/OS combination (notably Firefox-for-Android and in-app webviews), the 1Shot architecture supports a LongBlob fallback: the authenticator stores the 32-byte EVM private key in credBlob (at registration) or largeBlob (at authentication) inside the credential itself. The key is generated on the client at registration time.

Consequences:

• In PRF mode, a user has exactly one credential. Adding a second passkey would produce a different PRF output, i.e. a different wallet.
• In LongBlob mode, a user can have many passkeys — each stores a copy of the same key.
• Always provide a recovery-phrase path (AES-encrypted key stored server-side) so a user who loses access to all their passkeys can still recover.

See references/longblob-fallback.md for details.

5. Every wallet operation requires a fresh passkey ceremony

Even if the user has a valid session cookie, performing a wallet operation (signing a transaction, creating a delegation) must trigger a passkey ceremony in the iframe. Rationale:

• The derived key is only held in iframe memory while the wallet is "unlocked" after a ceremony. If the app is backgrounded / reloaded, the iframe loses the key and needs another ceremony.
• This matches the user's mental model of "approving" each transaction with their fingerprint / Face ID / PIN.
• Defense-in-depth: even if a session is hijacked, the attacker still can't sign anything without the user's biometric.

Structure your proxy so that signIn can be called at any time and is idempotent (returns the cached unlock result if already unlocked for this session), and signing methods call an internal assureWallet() that triggers a ceremony if needed.

Implementation Workflow

Use this order when building a new app that uses this pattern:

1. Gate the platform. On the registration / login page, call isPlatformSupported() (see assets/platformSupport.ts). If it returns false, route the user to a waiting-list / recovery-phrase-only flow rather than letting them register a passkey that can't be used.

1. Set up the wallet iframe route. Create a same-origin page (e.g. /wallet/local) that loads a Postmate Model. Keep its dependency graph small — import only what's needed for the passkey ceremony, key derivation, and signing. Return `` as the component's default render (the iframe doesn't need UI most of the time).

1. Build the WalletProxy in the parent app. It holds the Postmate.ParentAPI handle and exposes typed methods like signIn(username), getAccountAddress(), signMessage(msg), getERC3009Signature(...). Wrap each method in an RPC envelope with a nonce so responses can be correlated (see assets/WalletIframeSketch.ts).

1. Implement the server endpoints (framework-agnostic):

• POST /api/auth/register — no body → returns registration options with a 32-byte PRF salt base64url-encoded in extensions.prf.eval.first; with credential → verifies and persists the credential.
• POST /api/auth/login — no credential → returns authentication options (no PRF salt here; the salt is reconstructed client-side from the infoLabel); with credential → verifies and starts a session.
• Store the challenge nonce in Redis (or equivalent) with a ~60s TTL keyed by a server-generated challengeId that is returned to the client and echoed back.

1. Wire the registration flow (runs in the parent page, NOT the iframe, so the initial credential creation happens in the primary browsing context):

• Fetch options, decode the PRF salt from base64url to an ArrayBuffer, generate a random EVM private key locally (for LongBlob storage if supported), call navigator.credentials.create({ publicKey }), inspect clientExtensionResults to decide if PRF or LongBlob is available, send the response back to the server.
• After the server confirms, call walletProxy.signIn(username) to run the first authentication ceremony (this time in the iframe) and let the iframe learn the account address.

1. Wire the sign-in flow (runs in the iframe via the proxy):

• Parent calls walletProxy.signIn(username).
• Iframe fetches authentication options from the server, adds the PRF extension with eval.first = TextEncoder().encode(infoLabel), calls startAuthentication(), reads clientExtensionResults.prf.results.first as unknown, normalizes it to ArrayBuffer, then runs HKDF derivation to get the EVM private key, constructs an ethers.Wallet, posts the authentication response back for server verification, and caches the wallet in memory.

1. Wire signing operations. Any method that signs uses assureWallet() which either returns the cached wallet or triggers authenticateWithPasskey() again.

1. Add the recovery flow. At registration (after a successful sign-in), prompt the user to create a recovery phrase; derive an AES-256 key from the phrase via PBKDF2, encrypt the private key, send the ciphertext to the server. At recovery, the user types their recovery phrase and accountRecoveryId, the server returns the ciphertext, the client decrypts and re-authenticates.

Critical Implementation Nuances

These are the things that will cost you a day each if you miss them. The reference files go deeper on each.

PRF salt encoding

• On the server, generate 32 random bytes and base64url-encode them into extensions.prf.eval.first — not plain base64. The WebAuthn library on the client may or may not accept unpadded/padded base64, and you avoid ambiguity by being strict.
• On the client during registration, you must decode the base64url back to an ArrayBuffer (e.g. with @simplewebauthn/browser's base64URLStringToBuffer) before handing to navigator.credentials.create. A common bug is leaving it as a string — the browser silently ignores PRF and clientExtensionResults.prf comes back undefined.
• On the client during authentication, the salt that feeds key derivation should be constant and baked into your code, not fetched from the server. Use something like new TextEncoder().encode("com.example.eth-key-v1"). This way, even if the server is compromised it cannot redirect the user to a different derived key.

Checking PRF support happens at two different shapes

• At registration the authenticator reports support via clientExtensionResults.prf.enabled === true. Results are optional here; enabled is the signal.
• At authentication you usually get PRF bytes via clientExtensionResults.prf.results.first, but treat it as unknown at runtime and normalize before HKDF. Accept ArrayBuffer, typed-array/DataView, and optionally base64url/base64 strings if your WebAuthn stack serializes extension data. If normalization fails (or the value is undefined), authentication may still succeed server-side but you cannot derive the wallet key — show a provider-compatibility error and block sign-in.
• Do not pass raw unknown PRF data directly into crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", ...). If the value is not a BufferSource, browsers throw TypeError: Key data must be a BufferSource for non-JWK formats.

The infoLabel is part of the key forever

Pick it once, put it in a constant with a clear comment, and never change it. If you later want a second key (e.g., for a different purpose), use a different infoLabel for the new key — don't change the original.

Platform detection must exclude webviews explicitly

User-agent sniffing is fragile but in this case unavoidable: in-app webviews (Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, iOS WKWebView without Safari) do not support PRF even when the underlying browser engine does. See assets/platformSupport.ts for the detection heuristics. Fail closed: if you can't tell, don't let the user register a passkey that won't work.

Iframe must not be display: none during the passkey ceremony

Several browsers refuse to show the WebAuthn prompt if the iframe's ancestor chain has display: none. The pattern in 1Shot's WalletProxy:

1. Right before calling into the iframe, set the container to display: block !important; position: fixed; width: 1px; height: 1px; opacity: 0; pointer-events: none; z-index: -1.
2. Focus the iframe's contentWindow to preserve user activation.
3. After the RPC resolves, restore the original (hidden) state.

This is worth its own look in references/iframe-isolation.md.

Iframe allow attribute is required

Set allow="publickey-credentials-get publickey-credentials-create" on the iframe element. Without this, navigator.credentials.* inside the iframe throws or silently fails depending on the browser.

User activation survives one postMessage hop when triggered from a user gesture

WebAuthn APIs require transient user activation. When the user clicks a button in the parent page, the activation is consumed quickly. You must call this.child.call(eventName, ...) (via Postmate) synchronously inside the click handler so the iframe still sees navigator.userActivation.isActive === true. Don't wrap it behind an extra setTimeout or unrelated await.

secp256k1 range validation isn't just theoretical

The HKDF output is uniformly random 32 bytes; the probability it's ≥ N or zero is astronomically small, but spec-correct implementations must reject out-of-range keys. Loop wi

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Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: 1Shot-API
• Source: 1Shot-API/skills
• License: MIT
• Homepage: https://1shotapi.com

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.