Secure Auth

Secure Authentication

Authentication is the front door to your system, and it is the single control attackers probe hardest. The goal of this skill is not to teach you to invent a clever scheme — it is to help you assemble well-understood primitives correctly, because almost every real-world breach in this area comes from a broken assembly of good parts, not from cracked cryptography. Heavy detail lives in references/; copy-paste material in examples/; a runnable policy check in scripts/.

Mental model

Three distinct questions get muddled constantly. Keep them separate:

| Question | Concern | Wrong answer looks like | |---|---|---| | Who are you? | Authentication (login, password, MFA) | trusting a client-supplied user_id | | What may you do? | Authorization (roles, ownership, scopes) | checking auth but not ownership (IDOR) | | How do we remember you? | Session management (cookies/tokens) | long-lived tokens you can't revoke |

A request can be perfectly authenticated and still be an attack if you skip authorization. The most common API vulnerability — Broken Object Level Authorization — is exactly this: a logged-in user reads /accounts/124 when they only own 124's neighbor. Always check ownership server-side, never trust an identifier the client could change.

1. Password storage: slow hash, never plaintext

The non-negotiable rule: never store a recoverable password. Store a one-way hash produced by a deliberately slow algorithm so that a stolen database is expensive to crack offline.

import argon2 from 'argon2';

// Registration / password change — argon2id is the current default recommendation.
const hash = await argon2.hash(password, { type: argon2.argon2id });
// Store `hash` (it embeds the salt + cost params). NEVER store `password`.

// Login — constant-time verify; argon2 reads cost params from the stored hash.
const ok = await argon2.verify(hash, attempt);

Use argon2id (preferred) or bcrypt (battle-tested, fine if argon2 isn't available). Never use fast general-purpose hashes (MD5, SHA-256) — a GPU computes billions of those per second, so a leak becomes a mass account takeover within hours. Always salt (argon2/bcrypt do this for you), and validate the password against a policy and a breached-password list before hashing — run scripts/check-password-policy.mjs --selftest to see the kind of check that belongs at this boundary. The full parameter-tuning guidance is in [references/password-hashing.md](references/password-hashing.md).

2. Sessions vs JWT: how you remember a logged-in user

Two dominant models, with a real trade-off around revocation:

• Server-side sessions — a random opaque session ID in an HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite cookie; state

lives server-side (DB/Redis). Revocation is trivial: delete the row. This is the safe default for classic web apps.

• Stateless JWTs — a signed token the client carries. Scales without shared session storage, but you

cannot un-issue a signed token before it expires. Mitigate with short-lived access tokens (5–15 min) plus a revocable, rotating refresh token kept server-side.

Set-Cookie: session=9f2c...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax; Path=/; Max-Age=3600

Storage matters enormously: a token in localStorage is readable by any XSS payload, so prefer HttpOnly cookies (which JavaScript cannot read) over web storage for anything that authenticates a request. The complete comparison — expiry, refresh rotation, reuse detection, and revocation strategies — is in [references/sessions-vs-jwt.md](references/sessions-vs-jwt.md).

3. MFA and step-up

A password alone is a single point of failure against phishing and credential stuffing. Offer a second factor and require it for sensitive actions (password change, payouts):

• TOTP (authenticator app) — good baseline, phishable but cheap.
• WebAuthn / passkeys — phishing-resistant, hardware-backed; prefer where you can.
• SMS — weakest (SIM-swap), use only as a fallback.

Treat MFA as step-up: don't force it on every request, escalate it when risk rises.

4. OAuth2 / OIDC: delegated auth done right

When you offload login to a provider (Google, an identity platform), use OAuth2 Authorization Code flow with PKCE for web and mobile/SPA clients. Do not use the implicit flow (deprecated) and never the resource-owner password flow for third-party login. OIDC layers an identity id_token on top of OAuth2's access token. Validate the id_token signature, iss, aud, and exp, and use the state parameter to defend against CSRF on the callback. See [references/oauth2-oidc.md](references/oauth2-oidc.md) for the full flow diagrams and validation checklist, and examples/auth-flow.md for an annotated walk-through.

5. Account recovery

Recovery flows are a favorite bypass — they are authentication's back door. Make reset tokens single-use, time-limited (e.g. 15–30 min), and high-entropy, store only their hash, and invalidate all active sessions on a successful reset. Critically, return the same response whether or not the email exists, and keep timing uniform, so the endpoint can't be used to enumerate accounts.

Common pitfalls (failure modes)

• Fast/unsalted hashes (SHA-256, MD5) — instantly crackable at scale after a DB leak.
• JWT you can't revoke — a long-lived access token stays valid after logout/compromise; keep them short.
• Tokens in localStorage — any XSS exfiltrates them; use HttpOnly cookies.
• Session fixation — not rotating the session ID on login lets an attacker pre-seed a known ID; always

regenerate the session identifier at the moment privilege changes.

• Missing CSRF protection on cookie-authenticated state-changing requests — use SameSite cookies

plus anti-CSRF tokens. See [references/auth-attacks.md](references/auth-attacks.md).

• Account enumeration — different responses/timing for "wrong password" vs "no such user."
• No rate limiting / lockout — credential stuffing walks straight in; throttle and add MFA.
• Authn without authz — checking who but not whether they own this object (IDOR/BOLA).

When NOT to roll your own / trade-offs

Prefer a vetted identity provider or library over hand-built auth whenever you can. Building it yourself means owning password reset, MFA enrollment, session revocation, breach monitoring, and audit trails forever. Reach for a managed IdP (OIDC provider, an auth platform) when you want SSO, social login, or compliance offload; the cost is vendor lock-in and per-MAU pricing. Build in-house only when you have hard data-residency constraints or genuinely unusual requirements — and even then, wrap proven libraries (argon2, a maintained OAuth2 client) rather than primitives. Stateless JWT trades easy revocation for horizontal scale; if you rarely need to scale auth across regions, server-side sessions are simpler and safer.

Files in this package

• references/password-hashing.md — argon2id vs bcrypt, cost tuning, pepper, rehash-on-login
• references/sessions-vs-jwt.md — cookies vs tokens, expiry, refresh rotation, revocation
• references/oauth2-oidc.md — Authorization Code + PKCE, token validation, OIDC claims
• references/auth-attacks.md — credential stuffing, session fixation, CSRF, enumeration + defenses
• examples/jwt-verify.ts — dependency-light JWT verification with the right checks
• examples/auth-flow.md — annotated login + refresh + OAuth2 callback walk-through
• scripts/check-password-policy.mjs — runnable policy check (length, classes, breached list); --selftest

Pairs with owasp-top10, secrets-management, rest-api-design, audit-logging, and gdpr-compliance.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: vanara-agents
• Source: vanara-agents/skills
• License: Apache-2.0
• Homepage: https://vanaraagents.com

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.