Afc:security

/afc:security — Security Scan

> Detects and reports security vulnerabilities in the codebase. > Inspects against OWASP Top 10. Read-only — does not modify code.

Arguments

• $ARGUMENTS — (optional) scan scope (file/directory path, or "full" for full scan)
• If not specified: scans only files changed in the current branch

Config Load

Architecture, Code Style, and Project Context are auto-loaded via .claude/rules/afc-project.md. Read .claude/afc.config.md if CI commands are needed.

If neither rules file nor config exists: read CLAUDE.md for framework info. Assume "unknown" if no source has it.

For dependency audit command: infer from packageManager field in package.json or the lockfile (e.g., npm audit, yarn audit, pnpm audit).

Execution Steps

1. Determine Scan Scope

• $ARGUMENTS = path → that path only
• $ARGUMENTS = "full" → entire codebase
• Not specified → changed files from:

!git diff --name-only HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo "[GIT_DIFF_FAILED]"

2. Agent Teams (when scan complexity warrants it)

Use Agent Teams when the scan scope is complex enough that a single-pass review would miss cross-file vulnerability patterns. Assess holistically:

• File types: Auth handlers, trust boundary code, and input-processing layers warrant deeper multi-agent scrutiny than config files or simple utilities
• Code volume: Large files with dense logic benefit from focused agent attention
• Diversity of concerns: Multiple distinct security domains (auth + injection + data exposure) across separate modules
• Trust boundaries: Files that cross privilege levels (user input → DB, client → server, public → internal API)

Use Agent Teams when any of the following apply:

• Scan includes auth handlers, session management, or access control logic spanning multiple files
• Input entry points and their sanitization/consumption code live in different directories
• The scope spans multiple distinct security domains that cannot be assessed in a single coherent pass

Use direct scan (orchestrator only) when:

• Scope is a single module or tightly-coupled set of files
• Security concerns are localized (e.g., one feature, one data flow)
• No cross-file trust boundary transitions are involved

Pre-scan: Data Flow Context (before distributing to agents, when using Agent Teams):

1. For each changed file, identify input entry points (user input, API params, URL params, form data) and sanitization calls (validation, escaping, encoding)
2. Trace input flow across changed files: where does user input enter? Where is it sanitized? Where is it consumed?
3. Include this context in each agent's prompt:

``` ## Data Flow Context Input flows relevant to your scan scope:

• User input enters via req.body in api/routes.ts → sanitized by validateInput() in shared/validation.ts → consumed in features/user.ts
• URL params enter via req.params in api/routes.ts → NO sanitization found → used in features/search.ts

Account for these flows when assessing injection/XSS severity. ```

Task("Security scan: src/features/", subagent_type: general-purpose,
  prompt: "... {include Data Flow Context} ...")
Task("Security scan: src/shared/api/", subagent_type: general-purpose,
  prompt: "... {include Data Flow Context} ...")

For direct scans (orchestrator only): skip pre-scan — orchestrator has full context.

2.5. Cross-Boundary Verification

Read ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/cross-boundary-verification.md and apply it after parallel agent results are collected.

3. Security Check Items

A. Injection (A03:2021)

• Uses of dangerouslySetInnerHTML
• User input inserted directly into DOM/URL/queries
• Uses of eval(), new Function()

B. Broken Authentication (A07:2021)

• Hardcoded tokens or credentials
• API routes accessible without authentication
• Session management vulnerabilities

C. Sensitive Data Exposure (A02:2021)

• .env values exposed to the client (check framework-specific public env variables from Project Context)
• Sensitive information printed via console.log
• Internal details exposed in error messages

D. Security Misconfiguration (A05:2021)

• CORS configuration
• CSP headers
• Unnecessary debug mode enabled

E. XSS (A03:2021)

• Patterns that bypass React's default escaping
• URL parameters rendered without validation
• Dynamic injection of iframes or scripts

F. Dependencies (A06:2021)

• Packages with known vulnerabilities (dependency audit tool results)
• Outdated dependencies

4. Output Results

## Security Scan Results

### Summary
| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | {N} |
| High | {N} |
| Medium | {N} |
| Low | {N} |

### Findings

#### SEC-{NNN}: {title}
- **Category**: {OWASP code}
- **File**: {path}:{line}
- **Description**: {vulnerability details}
- **Impact**: {impact if exploited}
- **Mitigation**: {how to fix}

### Dependency Audit
{dependency audit command result summary — if executable}

### Recommended Actions
{prioritized fix suggestions}

5. Final Output

Security scan complete
├─ Scope: {file count} files
├─ Found: Critical {N} / High {N} / Medium {N} / Low {N}
└─ Recommended: {most urgent action}

Notes

• Read-only: Does not modify code. Reports security issues only.
• Minimize false positives: Account for React's default XSS defenses. Report only genuinely dangerous patterns.
• Handle sensitive data carefully: Do not include actual token or password values in scan results.
• Consider context: Reflect security specifics for the project's framework environment (from Project Context).

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: jhlee0409
• Source: jhlee0409/all-for-claudecode
• License: MIT
• Homepage: https://www.npmjs.com/package/all-for-claudecode

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.