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Dissecting Boot And Kernel Rootkits

skill-meltedinhex-analyst-ai-pack-dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits · by meltedinhex

Analyzes bootkit and rootkit samples by identifying boot-process tampering (MBR/VBR/

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-meltedinhex-analyst-ai-pack-dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits

✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

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About

Dissecting Boot and Kernel Rootkits

When to Use

  • You have a sample (MBR/VBR image, UEFI module, or kernel driver) suspected of boot-process or

kernel-level tampering and stealth.

  • You need to identify the persistence vector and stealth technique class statically.

Do not use this on production firmware/boot media without acquisition — analyze a captured image. The skill reads bytes statically and executes nothing.

Prerequisites

  • The boot image / UEFI module / driver (read inertly).

Safety & Handling

  • Read bytes statically; never write the sample to boot media or load the driver.

Workflow

Step 1: Classify the artifact

python scripts/analyst.py classify sample.bin

Detects MBR/VBR (boot signature 0x55AA at 0x1FE), UEFI modules (PE with EFI subsystem / PI GUIDs / EFI_ strings), and kernel drivers (PE importing ntoskrnl/hal, .sys indicators).

Step 2: Identify tampering / hooking indicators

Flag disk-write primitives (Int 13h for MBR bootkits), SSDT/IRP hooking and Zw*/Ke* kernel APIs, DKOM strings, and driver-callback registration.

Step 3: Map the persistence vector

Determine whether persistence is via MBR/VBR overwrite, UEFI variable/module, or driver service.

Step 4: Document

Record the artifact type, persistence vector, and stealth technique class, mapping to ATT&CK.

Validation

  • The artifact type is identified by concrete signatures (boot signature, PE subsystem, imports).
  • Tampering/hooking indicators reference real primitives, not generic strings.
  • The persistence vector is stated with its evidence.

Pitfalls

  • A legitimate bootloader/driver resembling a bootkit/rootkit — corroborate with behavior.
  • UEFI modules requiring firmware-volume parsing beyond simple PE checks.
  • Kernel samples needing signed-driver and callback context to confirm stealth.

References

  • See [references/api-reference.md](references/api-reference.md) for the classifier.
  • ATT&CK T1542.003 and T1014 (linked in frontmatter).

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.