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SKILL verified Apache-2.0 Self-run

Analyzing Wiper Malware

skill-meltedinhex-analyst-ai-pack-analyzing-wiper-malware · by meltedinhex

Analyzes destructive wiper malware by identifying raw-disk and MBR/VBR overwrite

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-meltedinhex-analyst-ai-pack-analyzing-wiper-malware

✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
  • ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
  • ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • ✓ Untrusted network calls
  • ✓ Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • ✓ Network access No
  • ✓ Filesystem access No
  • ✓ Shell / process execution No
  • ✓ Environment & secrets No
  • ✓ Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

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About

Analyzing Wiper Malware

When to Use

  • You have a sample suspected of destructive intent and need to identify disk-overwrite, MBR/VBR

tampering, and mass-deletion primitives.

  • You must distinguish a wiper (irreversible destruction) from ransomware (encryption for ransom).

Do not use this on a live host or by running the sample — destructive behavior is the threat. Analyze statically in isolation.

Prerequisites

  • The sample, read inertly.

Safety & Handling

  • Read bytes statically; never execute. A wiper run is unrecoverable — isolation is mandatory.

Workflow

Step 1: Detect destructive primitives

python scripts/analyst.py scan sample.bin

Flags raw-disk handles (\\.\PhysicalDrive, \\.\C:), DeviceIoControl, MBR/VBR write patterns, CreateFileMapping over the boot sector, and bulk DeleteFile/overwrite loops.

Step 2: Detect backup/recovery destruction

Surface vssadmin delete shadows, wbadmin delete, bcdedit /set recoveryenabled no, and wevtutil cl (log clearing) — common wiper recovery-denial steps.

Step 3: Distinguish wiper vs ransomware

Weigh destruction-without-crypto and absence of a ransom note / key exchange against encryption-and-extortion indicators to classify intent.

Step 4: Document

Record the destruction method (overwrite pattern, MBR vs file-level) and recovery-denial steps.

Validation

  • Destructive primitives reference real raw-disk/boot-record APIs, not generic file IO.
  • Recovery-denial commands are detected where present.
  • The wiper-vs-ransomware classification cites concrete evidence.

Pitfalls

  • Disk utilities and secure-erase tools share these primitives — context is essential.
  • Pseudo-ransomware wipers that display a note but cannot decrypt (intent is destruction).
  • Bootloader-only wipers needing boot-sector analysis (pair with the rootkit/bootkit skill).

References

  • See [references/api-reference.md](references/api-reference.md) for the scanner.
  • ATT&CK T1561 and T1485 (linked in frontmatter).

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.

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