Install
$ agentstack add skill-wdm0006-python-skills-git-hygiene ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ● Environment & secrets Used
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Keeping Git Repos Clean
Two classes of files keep ending up in repos: secrets and dev artifacts. Both are cheap to prevent and expensive to clean up after the fact, because git history is forever and public repos publish everything.
The one rule everyone forgets
.gitignore does NOT untrack files that are already committed. Adding a path to .gitignore only prevents future untracked files from being staged. A file git is already tracking keeps getting committed regardless. This bites repeatedly: a .env is listed in .gitignore but was committed before the rule existed, so it keeps shipping.
To actually stop tracking a file while keeping your local copy:
git rm --cached path/to/file # untrack, leave working-tree copy in place
git rm -r --cached some/dir/ # for a directory
echo "path/to/file" >> .gitignore # then ignore it so it doesn't come back
git commit -m "Stop tracking ; add to .gitignore"
--cached is the important flag — plain git rm deletes the working copy too.
Audit what a repo actually tracks
Don't trust .gitignore to tell you what's clean — read the index directly:
git ls-files | grep -iE '\.(env|pem|key|p12|profraw|log|bak|db|sqlite3?)$'
git ls-files | grep -iE '(^|/)(\.DS_Store|~\$|todo\.db|node_modules/|__pycache__/)'
git ls-files '*.db' '*.sqlite*' # scratch databases
git ls-files | xargs -I{} du -h {} | sort -rh | head # surprisingly large tracked files
Usual suspects seen across real repos:
- Secrets:
.envwith a live token, hardcodedAWS_*/DB creds in a settings
module, SECRET_KEY = "CHANGEME"/"foobar" placeholders shipped to prod.
- Build artifacts: LaTeX
.aux/.toc/.log/.synctex.gz/.pdf, LLVM*.profraw,
compiled binaries, htmlcov/, dist/, *.egg-info/.
- Scratch / personal artifacts:
todo.dband other tool-local SQLite scratch
DBs, editor backups (*.backup, *.bak, ~$*.docx Word lock files), stray *.log.
- OS noise:
.DS_Store,Thumbs.db.
Secrets need more than git rm
Removing a secret from HEAD does not remove it from history — git log -p and the commit that introduced it still expose it. Three things must happen, in order, and the first is the only one that actually protects you:
- Rotate the credential. Treat any secret that ever touched a remote as
compromised. Issue a new token/key/password and revoke the old one. Do this first — the leaked value is public the moment it was pushed.
- Untrack going forward (
git rm --cached+.gitignore+.env.example
documenting which vars are needed, with placeholder values only).
- Scrub history if required (
git filter-repo --invert-paths --path .env,
or BFG) and force-push. This rewrites SHAs and disrupts collaborators, so it's usually a deliberate maintainer step done after rotation — not an automated PR.
A PR that does (2) and (3) but skips (1) gives false comfort: the value is still valid and still in history clones/forks. Always call out rotation as the required human follow-up.
"Committed" means "published"
For public repos — and especially static sites deployed with path: '.' (GitHub Pages uploads the entire repo) — every tracked file is fetchable at a public URL. A scratch todo.db at the repo root of a brochure site is served at /todo.db. Before committing to any public repo, assume anyone can download it.
Prevent it: global ignore + a secret scanner
Per-developer noise (editor files, OS files, tool scratch DBs like todo.db) should be ignored globally, not in every project's .gitignore — that way it never lands anywhere:
git config --global core.excludesFile ~/.gitignore_global
printf '%s\n' '.DS_Store' '*.swp' 'todo.db' '*.profraw' >> ~/.gitignore_global
Block secrets at commit time with a pre-commit hook so they never reach history:
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
rev: v8.18.0
hooks: [{id: gitleaks}]
- repo: https://github.com/Yelp/detect-secrets
rev: v1.5.0
hooks: [{id: detect-secrets, args: ["--baseline", ".secrets.baseline"]}]
A starter project .gitignore (commit this):
# Secrets / local config
.env
.env.*
!.env.example
*.pem
*.key
# Python build/test artifacts
__pycache__/
*.py[cod]
build/
dist/
*.egg-info/
.coverage
htmlcov/
.pytest_cache/
# Scratch / OS / editor
*.db
*.sqlite
*.sqlite3
*.profraw
*.log
*.bak
*.backup
.DS_Store
~$*
Checklist
Audit:
- [ ] `git ls-files` reviewed for secrets, build output, scratch DBs, OS files
- [ ] No live credentials in tracked source or .env
- [ ] No surprisingly large/binary tracked files
Remediate (if dirty):
- [ ] Secret rotated/revoked FIRST (history is public the moment it was pushed)
- [ ] `git rm --cached` + .gitignore entry for each offending file
- [ ] .env.example documents required vars with placeholder values only
- [ ] History scrub flagged as a maintainer follow-up if the secret is in history
Prevent:
- [ ] Project .gitignore covers secrets, build artifacts, OS/editor noise
- [ ] Global core.excludesFile catches per-developer scratch files
- [ ] gitleaks / detect-secrets pre-commit hook installed
For scanning source code for vulnerabilities and hardcoded-secret patterns, see the auditing-python-security skill — this skill is about what git tracks.
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: wdm0006
- Source: wdm0006/python-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.